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Economic Development and Charitable Status: As Cold as Charity? 
Juliet Chevalier-Watts* 
 
This article considers the issue of whether economic and community development can be a 
charitable purpose under New Zealand law and debates whether authorities reflect too 
restrictive an approach, thus limiting the expansion of the law of charities. 
 
The origin of the meaning of charity is to be found in the Statute of Elizabeth, or the 
Charitable Uses Act 1601.  The preamble of this Act provides purposes that are deemed to 
be charitable, including the relief of the aged, impotent or poor people, maintenance of sick 
and maimed soldiers and mariners; the repair of bridges and churches; and the marriage of 
poor maids, to note but a few.  This is not an exhaustive list, and other purposes may be 
charitable where “those purposes are charitable which that statute enumerates or which by 
analogies are deemed within its spirit and intendment.”1 
 
The seminal case of Commissioners for the Special Purposes of the Income Tax v Pemsel 
(1891) AC 531 provided further clarity regarding charitable trusts, establishing four heads of 
charity under which all charitable trusts must fall;  the four heads being: 
 
• Relief of poverty; 
• Advancement of education; 
• Advancement of religion; and 
• Other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the preceding 
heads. 
 
An object may fall under one of these, but this does not automatically mean that the object 
will be charitable, for not only must an object fall under one of the Pemsel heads, it must, 
inter alia, also satisfy the public benefit test.2  In other words, the purposes of the entity 
must benefit a sufficient section of the public as opposed to having private purposes.  There 
is an argument that in cases where trusts are for the relief of poverty, and the advancement 
of religion or education, the benefit will be presumed, whereas all other cases the benefit 
will have to be proven.3  However, where there may be a presumed benefit, there is 
evidence that the courts are more than willing to test that presumption fully.4  The 
questions for the Charities Commission of New Zealand and the courts are whether 
community and economic development organisations are charitable and when and how 
such entities may satisfy the public benefit test.  For such organisations, their charitable 
purposes are most likely to be determined under the Pemsel heads of relief of poverty, the 
advancement of education and other purposes beneficial to the community.5  Such 
considerations have been brought sharply in to focus since the recent High Court decision of 
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Canterbury Development Corporation v Charities Commission.6  Before delving into the 
issues surrounding this case, it is worthwhile a moment to consider the role of the Charities 
Commission.  
 
The Charities Commission was established by the Charities Act 2005 as an Autonomous 
Crown Entity.  Such entities are established by or under Statute and are required to have 
regard to Government policy when directed by the relevant Minister.7   The Commission has 
numerous functions, as set out in s10 of the Act, and include: 
 
• Promotion of public confidence and trust in the charitable sector; 
• Educate and assist charities in relation to good governance and management; 
• Receive, review and process applications for consideration for registration as a 
charitable trust; 
• Receive, review and process Annual Returns submitted by charitable trusts; 
• Monitor and promote compliance with the Charities Act 2005.8 
 
Existing charities that are registered under the Charitable Trusts Act 1957 are required to 
apply for registration by the Commission under the Charities Act 2005, if, inter alia, the trust 
wishes to retain their tax exempt status.9  The Commission began receiving applications for 
registration as charitable entities when the Register opened in February 2007.  Since that 
time, the Commission has reviewed over 30,000 applications and registered over 25,000 
charitable trusts. 
 
In May 2008, Canterbury Development Corporation (CDC), the Canterbury Development 
Corporation Trust (CDCT) and the Canterbury Economic Development Fund (CEDF) applied 
for registration under the Charities Act 2005, and in September 2009, the Charities 
Commission rejected their application.   The appellants appealed the decision to the High 
Court, which considered the three appeals separately, although it was clear from the 
judgments that there were many common factors across the appeals.10  As a result of the 
commonality between the appeals, this paper will focus on the judgment delivered on CDC. 
 
CDC’s role is, inter alia, to stimulate economic growth through a number of objectives, 
including providing economic development leadership; providing business support to fast 
track companies; focusing on projects that will develop the economy, including securing 
Broadband; and supporting long-term infrastructure development.11  The objects for which 
the Trust was established included: the relief of poverty; to support and assist people 
seeking employment; to encourage skill and industry; to expand employment; to encourage, 
promote and facilitate business; and to provide various services to businesses.12   
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Section 5(1) of the Charities Act 2005 codifies the heads of charity as set out in the case of 
Pemsel, and defines charitable purpose as including every charitable purpose whether “it 
relates to the relief of poverty, the advancement of education or religion, or any other 
matter beneficial to the community.”  Additionally, to be charitable at law, the purpose 
must be for the public benefit.13  Therefore the question for the Charities Commission, in 
the first instance, was whether the CDC objects set out in Clause 2 of its Constitution, that of 
community development, met the criteria under section 5 of the Charities Act 2005, and in 
particular whether economic and community development could fulfil the public benefit 
test. 
 
The appellant’s arguments pertaining to charitable purpose were that its objectives: 
 
• Relieved poverty; 
• Advanced education; and 
• Benefitted the community. 
 
With respect to the relief of poverty, Justice Young noted that the relief of unemployment 
can be a charitable purpose under the head of relief of poverty,14 as acknowledged in IRC v 
Oldham Training and Enterprise Council.15  The appellant submitted that the work of CDC 
creates employment, therefore the unemployed are benefitted in two ways: 
 
• The creation of new jobs encourages employees to move into new roles, thus 
creating new opportunities for unemployed people; and 
• Creating skilled jobs creates a need for service jobs, therefore creating employment 
for the unemployed.16 
 
The Charities Commission confirmed that in order to relieve poverty, the purpose must be 
directed at those suffering genuine hardship in some respect, although poverty itself is 
interpreted broadly and does not necessarily refer to those who are financially destitute.  So 
to provide relief, the beneficiaries should have an identifiable need that arises from their 
condition, that the beneficiaries are unable to alleviate that suffering through their own 
resources, and further, the relief being provided by the entity should be direct.17  In the case 
of Re Tennant,18 the “settlor was attempting to achieve for a small new rural community 
what would then have been central to the life of that community: a cluster complex of a 
school, public hall, church and creamery.”19  In Justice Hammond’s view, this would confer 
economic and social benefit on the community, so in effect, promoting economic 
development would beneficial to a community that was in need of such an endeavour at 
that time.  With regard to the issue of employment, his Honour touched on that notion that 
the enterprise would have had the effect of furthering employment, although that in itself 
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was incidental and did not appear to be the purpose of the enterprise.20  However, his 
Honour made no further comment on the relevance of alleviating unemployment in this 
context and the relief of poverty, therefore it may be presumed that the furthering of 
employment was merely incidental to the purposes of that trust.  The case of IRC v Oldham 
Training and Enterprise Council21 also considered the issue of unemployment falling under 
the head of relief of poverty and, as was noted earlier, confirmed that providing 
employment may relieve poverty, but the objects of the Oldham Training and Enterprise 
Council, although improving the employment prospects in Oldham, also provided private 
benefits, thus meaning that benefits to the community conferred by any activities were too 
remote.   As a result, regardless of the motives of likely beneficial consequences for 
employment, the Oldham Training and Enterprise Council was disqualified from having 
charitable status.22  
 
I respectfully submit that on the issue of employment, the cases of Re Tennant and Oldham 
Training and Enterprise Council offer little support to the admissions of CDC, and I concur 
fully with the view of Justice Young.  His Honour notes that the purpose of CDC is not to 
further employment in its entirety, merely that the unemployed could be an ultimate 
beneficiary of its work.  Indeed, the purpose of CDC is to improve the economic wellbeing of 
the area, not to relieve poverty, so the possibility of assisting a person who is unemployed is 
too remote to qualify under the charitable head of relief of poverty.23  This view is 
consistent with approach taken in the cases of Re Tennant and Oldham Training and 
Enterprise Council and firmly entrenches the notion that the benefits to the community as a 
result of economic development must not be too remote and that the private benefits must 
not outweigh the public benefits. 
 
With respect to the advancement of education head, the Court dealt swiftly with the 
matter.  CDC submitted that the education aspect stemmed from providing business 
training, including financial, marketing and technical counselling.  His Honour could not 
conceive that such services could come within the provision of the advancement of 
education as intended by the Act.  His Honour confirmed that for a purpose to be charitable, 
then the opportunity must be available to a sufficient section of the community,24 and 
based on the strict criteria set out by CDC themselves,25 this would preclude eligibility under 
the requirements of public benefit.  This reflects the Charities Commission earlier succinct 
approach on the same matter.  In the Registration Decision, the Commission noted that 
“providing an educational course which is open to the public would be charitable under this 
head, however promoting Christchurch as a student destination would not amount to 
advancing education.”26  This strict approach may appear to be in conflict with the notion 
that this head of charity has traditionally been accepted as being diverse in nature 
suggesting a “judicially-tolerant approach”27 and indeed Brown suggests with the advent of 
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the Charities Commission, the Courts may adopt a more tolerant approach to the issue of 
educational diversity.28  However, I would submit that the High Court’s approach, and 
indeed that of the Charities Commission, in the case of CDC is not one of intolerance, rather 
it provides clarity in an area where the “case law has seen the scope of this head of charity 
extend far beyond the phrases in the Preamble”.29 Justice Young clearly comments that 
CDC’s criteria are too narrow to be construed as being of public benefit,30 and the Charities 
Commission explicitly provides an option that would ensure qualification under the head of 
advancement of education.31  So whilst both the High Court and the Commission dealt 
summarily with the matter of advancement of education, their approaches were entirely 
aligned  with previous case law and provided clarity, should there be any question as to 
whether a purpose may fulfil the requirement of public benefit. 
 
With respect to the third argument submitted by CDC, that of the purposes of CDC falling 
under the fourth charitable head of having purposes beneficial to the community, Justice 
Young took care to consider the relevant case law.  There are two tests that an entity must 
pass in order to qualify under this head of charity.  The first being that the actual activities 
fall within the spirit and intention of the Preamble of the Statute of Elizabeth, and the 
second being that the public benefit requirement is met. 
 
The appellant’s submission is that CDC’s constitution “comes within the fourth category of 
charitable purposes, given its promotion of economic development in Canterbury.”32  This 
economic development, CDC argues, is beneficial to the community because it enhances the 
economic well being of the community, as well as prohibiting any private benefit to 
individuals, although such benefits may be incidental to CDC’s charitable objects.33  As such, 
CDC submits that “there is no ground to say that it is outside the “spirit and intendment” as 
being charitable.”34  It is to this question of “spirit and intention of the Preamble” that this 
paper now turns. 
 
His Honour readily concurs that the objects and work of CDC are commendable, with their 
intention being to assist new businesses, but that in itself does not confirm that CDC has 
charitable intent.  Essentially, CDC will assist businesses in a hope that they will flourish and 
not all businesses who request help will receive it as the assistance is only available to those 
businesses that fall within a narrow banding.  Making profit and promotion are core to the 
purposes of CDC, not incidental, thus determining that CDC’s function is not within the spirit 
and intention of the Preamble.35   In coming to this determination, his Honour noted that 
charitable purpose of benefit to the community must be assuaged,36 and referred to the 
cases of Re Tennant and Tasmanian Electronic Commerce Centre v Commissioner of 
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Taxation.37  In the former case, “there was a small deprived rural community where the 
capacity to develop important services such as a school and public hall was provided”38 thus 
establishing the need in the community for such a charitable purpose.  In the latter case, 
such a need was also established.  In this case, the Federal Government established a 
Regional Telecommunications Infrastructure Fund Board (TRIF) whose objectives were to, 
inter alia, assist economic and social development of regional, rural and remote Australia by 
funding projects that enhance telecommunications infrastructure and increase access to 
telecommunications services in such areas.39 Justice Heerey noted that “benefits to 
Tasmania’s economy resulting in a long-term economic advantage to Tasmania will be a 
benefit to the Tasmanian public, and indeed to the wider national public.”40  This is of 
particular relevance to Tasmania because its small population and its great geographic 
distance from markets and raw materials meant that traditional methods of improving an 
economy such as conventional manufacturing, would not be of benefit to such places as 
Tasmania, especially as it had suffered net population decline, and its employment and 
income levels trailed that of the rest of Australia.41  Therefore there was an established 
need for the community and potential for businesses to develop and ensure that Tasmania 
was no longer the “poor relation of the rest of the nation.”42  Justice Young in the case of 
CDC noted that “no such claim of deprivation  is made with respect to Canterbury or 
Christchurch” so the community benefit cannot be assuaged and the cases of Re Tennant 
and Tasmanian Electronic Commerce Centre can be distinguished.  Such a narrow 
interpretation of whether a charitable purpose may fall within the spirit and intendment of 
the Preamble may appear unduly restrictive, especially when His Honour confirmed that 
case law on charitable purpose “has developed empirically and by analogy upon analogy.”43    
However, a useful case that considered this issue in some detail is the Canadian case of 
Vancouver Regional FreeNet Assn v MNR [1996] 3 FC 880. 44  
 
In this case Justice Hugessen reaffirmed that “whether an appellant falls within the fourth 
category of charities”45 will be determined as to whether its purposes fall within the spirit 
and intendment of the Preamble, which requires the Court to consider if the appellant has 
the same type of purpose as laid out in the Preamble.  His Honour also noted that the 
details of the types of purposes may change as society evolves, however, the actual types 
themselves will not change,46 thus suggesting that the issue of whether a charitable purpose 
will fall within the spirit and intendment of the Preamble may still be construed narrowly.  
The question for the Court was whether free access to the information highway is a 
charitable activity.  In its consideration, the Court acknowledged that “information is the 
currency of modern life” and any free exchange of such information can only be for the 
public good, thus reaffirming one of the core values of society as being freedom of speech, 
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and that being just one aspect of freedom of information.47  In assessing whether free 
access to the information highway may fall under the spirit and intendment of the 
Preamble, Justice Hugessen referred to the repair of bridges, ports, causeways and 
highways as recorded in the Preamble, which were, at the time, means of communication.  
It was therefore a straightforward step for the Court to recognise that a contemporary type 
of purpose similar to those detailed in the Preamble is within the intention of the 
Preamble.48  However, the dissenting opinion of Justice Décary provides further 
consideration regarding the issue of qualification of charitable under the fourth head, and 
indeed, his Honour offers a more cautionary approach.  His Honour does acknowledge that 
“the fourth head...has proven the testbed for the “gradual extension” of the law of charities 
beyond those purposes which have been recognized at common law”49 but the test itself 
remains that the purpose, and hence the benefit conferred, still falls within the spirit and 
intendment of the Preamble.50  However, Justice Décary identified two approaches taken by 
the English courts when deciding whether or not a purpose fulfils the criteria under the 
Preamble.  The cases of Morice v Bishop of Durham 51 and Barralet v Attorney-General 52 
demanded a restrictive approach, requiring that a purpose could only be brought within the 
spirit of the Act by analogy to an existing charitable purpose.53  His Honour then noted that 
the second approach adopted a more broad doctrine in assessing whether a purpose falls 
within the constructs of the Preamble,54 as determined by Russell LJ in the case of 
Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales v Attorney General55 where 
Justice Russell opined: 
 
In a case such as the present, which in my view the object cannot be though 
otherwise than beneficial to the community and of general public utility, I believe 
the proper question to ask is whether there are any grounds for holding it to be 
outside the equity of the Statute: and I think the answer to that is here in the 
negative. 
 
This broad approach reflects the submission by the appellant in the case of CDC, where it 
was noted that “the appellant submits in interpreting trust deeds...where there is ambiguity 
or uncertainty a benevolent interpretation favouring a presumption of charity should be 
used.”56 
 
Such an extensive interpretation of the equity of the Preamble is not accepted by Justice 
Décary in the case of Vancouver Regional FreeNet, and it is noted succinctly that “there is no 
Canadian authority for the principle that all purposes which in some way benefit the 
community are presumed to be charitable.  There is no such presumption.”57  His Honour 
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acknowledgeg that his learned colleagues have adopted an “open-minded approach 
characterizing purposes under the fourth head”58 but not withstanding such matters, Justice 
Décary is adamant that “mere provision of a benefit to the community is not tantamount to 
charitable trust.”59  Although not specifically referring to the Vancouver case, Justice Young 
in the case of CDC did not depart from the stricter interpretation of the dissenting opinion in 
the case of Vancouver Regional FreeNet, although his Honour is less emphatic than his 
learned colleague in the Vancouver case.  Justice Young recognised that the objects of CDC 
are laudable certainly, although being worthy will not itself establish CDC as having the 
necessary focus on charitable intent;60 the spirit and intendment of the Preamble of the 
Statute of Elizabeth are still fundamental to the requirement of having charitable purpose.  
The case of CDC confirms therefore that there can be no presumption that a benefit to the 
community is charitable and that a narrow interpretation of the spirit and intendment of the 
Preamble is the favourable approach.  This does not imply that the fourth Pemsel head of 
charity is failing to evolve, rather it confirms that any gradual extension of the fourth head 
“has been allowed in only the meritorious of circumstances.”61 
 
This paper now turns to the thorny issue of public benefit and the High Court’s 
interpretation of this charitable requirement.  Justice Young confirms that the public benefit 
must be expressly determined when the entity is claiming that the purpose falls under the 
fourth Pemsel head of charitable purpose, although the benefit does not necessarily have to 
apply to all the public, just a significant part.62  What is interesting is that both counsel 
identified the same case to support their submissions in this regard, the case of Oldham 
Training and Enterprise Council.  In this case, the Oldham Training and Enterprise Council 
was established to provide and promote vocational and educational training and re-training 
of the public in order to improve employability and promote the development of industry, 
commerce and enterprises for the benefit of the community.63  The Court in the instant case 
noted that “the existence of these objects, in so far as they confer freedom to provide such 
private benefits, regardless of the motive or likely beneficial consequences for employment 
must disqualify Oldham TEC from having charitable status.”64  What is noteworthy is that 
the Enterprise Council specifically targeted the unemployed in the context of business 
development; that training was targeted at assisting young people into work and retraining 
the unemployed; as well as providing cash allowances for those considering setting up 
businesses.65  Regardless however of the laudable motives of the Enterprise Council, the 
Court still took a restrictive stance in applying the public benefit test.  In the case of CDC, the 
appellants attempted to distinguish the activities of the Enterprise Council in the Oldham 
case with the activities of CDC.  The appellants submitted that there was a key distinguishing 
feature in the Oldham case, that the objects stated by the Enterprise Council were not 
specifically expressed as being charitable, whereas their objects expressly determined their 
charitable nature.66 
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In response to this submission, Justice Young confirmed that “the mere fact that the 
constitution says that CDC’s objects are charitable does not make CDC charitable although 
such a declaration is relevant in assessing whether they are.”67  Therefore his Honour 
concurred with the Charities Commission that whilst the appellant may undertake some 
charitable activities under certain of its clauses, the wording of the clauses allows the 
appellant to undertaken non-charitable activities also.  As a result, the objects will provide 
private benefits for business owners and any benefits conferred on the remainder of the 
community will be far too remote to be deemed to be charitable.68  Justice Young correctly 
determined that an entity may state that its objects are charitable, but in addition to that, 
the ultimate test is that the “objects and operation of the organisation either support[s] a 
charitable purpose or they do not”,69 as was identified in the Oldham case.  Thus any 
reliance on the Oldham case by CDC was ultimately futile as the appellant’s own 
distinguishing submissions failed to distinguish entirely the two cases.   
 
I respectfully submit that it was perhaps surprising that CDC should have attempted to 
distinguish the  Oldham case from its own situation, when, as was so eloquently stated by 
Justice Young: “the Enterprise Council could be considered to have a considerable more 
powerful case in favour of a declaration as a charity than CDC as far as public benefit is 
concerned.”70 
 
CDC also sought to challenge the notion that the mere fact that a company should make a 
profit as a result of its provision of business should not determine that its objects are not 
charitable. The appellant sought to rely on the approach advocated in the Tasmanian 
Electronic Commerce Centre case.  In this case, Justice Heerey determined that: 
 
Once it is accepted that assistance to business and industry can provide a public 
benefit of the kind which the law recognises as charitable…I do not see how the fact 
that individual businesses may benefit can be a disqualifying factor.  On the contrary, 
if business in general is assisted, it seems inevitable that some firms at least will 
become profitable, or more profitable, as a result of that assistance.  There would be 
no point in the exercise if this were not the case.  It would be an odd result if an 
institution established to benefit business could only qualify as a charity if the 
recipients of its benefits made losses or did no more than break even.71 
 
In reliance on this, the appellant submitted that the mere fact that companies assisted by 
the provision of business training may make a profit should not preclude their objects from 
being charitable.72  However, CDC’s submission is not advantageous for two reasons.  Firstly, 
this is because, as addressed already, the objects did not fall within the spirit and 
intendment of the Preamble of the Statute of Elizabeth.  The relevant issue in the CDC 
situation is that the assistance to business is central to its purposes, not ancillary, thus profit 
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is the central focus and the public benefit is a mere hope, as opposed to an explicit object.73  
The second reason that CDC’s reliance on the Tasmanian case is not of assistance is because 
the key issue in the instant case is that the Court recognised the public benefit requirement 
due to the fact that Tasmania was an economically deprived area, in comparison with the 
much of Australia, and the public benefit would encourage a boost in that poor economy.  
At no stage does CDC suggest that there is any such economic deprivation in Canterbury.  
Indeed, it is this very issue that is at the root of the considerations for the Court in the 
Tasmanian case.  In that case, the Court noted explicitly that “the focus of TECC is in an area 
where there is potential for business to develop unhindered by the restraints which in the 
past have made Tasmania a poor relation of the rest of the nation.”74  I submit that it would 
have been very unlikely that this Australian case would have benefitted the submissions of 
CDC given the underlying issues on which the Tasmanian case turned.  However, Justice 
Young in the case of CDC has left open the possibility that charitable purpose may be found 
in economic development should an “identifiably economically deprived area in New 
Zealand”75 be identified.   The effect of his Honour’s opinion is two fold.  Firstly, Justice 
Young has entrenched the notion that economic development may be construed as being 
charitable, but the reality being that there should be an identifiable economic need.  
Secondly his Honour confirmed that the fourth Pemsel head may evolve, but any extension 
of the purposes under that head will be constrained by the narrow interpretation of the test 
of public benefit. 
 
The matter of narrowness of interpretation was considered once more in the case of CDC 
when the Court turned its attention to the case of Commissioner of Taxation v The Triton 
Foundation [2005] FCA 1319,76 and endeavoured to distinguish the purposes of the two 
bodies.  The Triton case concerned a foundation set up to promote culture and 
entrepreneurship in Australia.  It did this by assisting innovators to commercialise their ideas 
by providing free advice on marketing, business planning and intellectual property ideas.  
Justice Kenny determined that Triton’s “principle object and activities can fairly be regarded 
as beneficial to the public as a whole.”77  This is even though Triton’s objectives were to 
promote the commercial aspect of novel ideas and to encourage the commercialisation of 
innovation and to recognise commercial utility of novel ideas.  Indeed, his Honour confirmed 
that the promotion of this type of commerce is capable of being charitable and falls within 
the spirit and intendment of the Preamble of the Statute of Elizabeth.78  This however does 
appear to be contrary to the considerations elucidated in the case of CDC, where 
commercialisation and profit, which were central to its purposes, were deemed to fall 
outside of the Preamble.    
 
It is perhaps for this reason that Justice Young in CDC attempted to distinguish the case of 
Triton from the case of CDC.   His Honour noted that the Court in Triton was satisfied that 
the overarching objection of the Foundation was to develop and promote innovation and 
entrepreneurship in Australia generally, whereas in the case of CDC, its focus was the 
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development and promotion of individual businesses.   The case of Triton Foundation 
appears to sit awkwardly with other cases of its genre.  I respectfully submit however that I 
am unable to distinguish so easily between the objects of the two cases, as both the Triton 
Foundation and CDC have commercialisation and profit as core principles.  However, Justice 
Young focuses decisively on the narrow criteria set out by CDC that determined how its 
funds would be allocated.   This criteria allowed any member of the public to approach CDC 
for funding, but limited significantly those who would receive financial assistance as the 
funding would generally only be given to those projects that would be likely to be most 
successful.  His Honour contrasted this with the criteria of the Triton Foundation, whose 
services could be available to anyone, but only those whose ideas were thought to be most 
likely to be most profitable were likely to receive funding.79   In reality, I can see little to 
distinguish the objectives of CDC and the Triton Foundation, however, it is perhaps 
understandable that Justice Young has been so determined to differentiate between the 
two situations.  The judgment of Justice Keeny in the case of Triton Foundation appears to 
extend the law of charities beyond that which has been recognised to date under the fourth 
head of Pemsel, therefore Justice Young in the case of CDC firmly reestablishes that such 
extensions should only be gradual and any interpretation of public benefit must be narrowly 
construed in order to “curb abuses in the administration of trusts of a charitable nature.”.80 
  
The jurisprudence of the law of charitable trusts and economic development has not been 
without issue, and the Courts have faced some challenges over the years in clarifying the 
law.  The case of CDC is a timely response to any questions that may have been arising as to 
whether the law of charitable trusts has been extended to include economic development 
within the four heads of charity, that of other purposes beneficial to the community.  It is 
clear that the authorities draw a distinction between the purpose of promoting industry, 
commerce and business and the purpose of promoting personal interests engaged in those 
elements of industry, commerce and business.  However, as can be seen, drawing such 
distinctions is not always straightforward, although the case of CDC has gone some way to 
entrench the notion that any interpretation of public benefit in relation to economic 
development should be done so cautiously, as well as affirming the authority of the 
Charities Commission in its role as watchdog.  This may be construed as a cold and 
conservative approach, both in relation to the decisions made by the Courts and by the 
Charities Commission, but it must be borne in mind that although charities operate for 
many different purposes, they all have one common feature: to provide the best possible 
outcome for their beneficiaries.  Thus a successful charity is not only one that fulfils that 
purpose, but also one that enjoys high levels of public trust and confidence.   Such decisions 
and judgments as delivered by the Charities Commission and Justice Young in the case of 
CDC respectively ensure that charitable purposes are subject to objective scrutiny, and so 
make certain that public may have the trust renewed in such processes and relevant bodies. 
So perhaps charity is not quite so cold as once thought? 
 
                                                     
79 Minter Ellison Rudd Watts ,“Tax Update, Cases” (2010) April at 2, www.minterellison.co.nz.  
80 Vancouver Regional FreeNet Assn v MNR, above n.44 at 15. 
